Abstract In this paper we present a model of spatial competition that highlights …rms' customization strategies in an imperfect competitive environment. The nature of competition in markets with products designed according to consumer preferences is discussed both in a framework of exogenous and endogenous set-up costs. Set-up costs are considered endogenous when technology is such that reductions in variable customization costs are feasible at additional set-up costs. It is shown that when set-up costs are exogenous, strategic interaction induces …rms to choose the most e¢cient customization technology, though the latter entails a reduction in prices and pro…ts and a more concentrated market structure. When set-up costs are endogenous, the incentive to choose strategically a more e¢cient customization technology depends on the possibility to cheaply transfer the customization costs into the set-up costs. This explains why customization is more frequently observed for information goods and in digital markets.
Introduction
Customization relates to the ability of …rms to provide highly designed products that better suit to consumers' preferences. Product and pricing strategies for customized goods and services allow …rms to gain a competitive advantage on rivals and may well explain why customization is becoming one of the most successful business strategies and a dominant model of production.
A customized product can be seen as a standard product modi…ed according to customers' needs, like a car with some optionals or a composite product made of modules combined by the customer. The di¤erences in customized products can be both physical di¤erences and di¤erences in services. 1 Software, music, books, as well as dresses and drinks are examples of industries of standard or information goods 2 whose characteristics are chosen by consumers on request, and that are sold both on digital marketplaces and by traditional retailers. This paper focuses on the role of strategic interaction among …rms in a monopolistic competitive framework in explaining pricing strategies for customized goods and services and its impact on market structure. In particular, we examine customized production as a dimension of production ‡exibility and we investigate the patterns and the possible implications of …rms' behaviour in the traditional and in the electronic markets. According to these purposes, the issues discussed in the paper are closely related to the economic literature on spatial product di¤erentiation and spatial price discrimination, as well as to the literature on technological competition, on ‡exible production and electronic commerce.
Customization is the production of di¤erent versions of a basic good as a consequence of heterogeneity in tastes. Since these di¤erent versions are sold at di¤erent prices, the analysis of customization has often been associated to that of price personalization (or perfect price discrimination). It must be stressed that the literature has mainly focussed on the pricing problem (e.g. Vulkan, 2000 and , which has been generally explained in terms of consumers' willingness to pay. As an example, most of the econometrics software is provided in two di¤erent versions: the most complete, also most expensive, for professional users, and the simplest, also cheapest, for light users, tipically students. Indeed, sophisticated collecting-information systems on consumers' pro…les make it possible nowadays to highly discriminate and personalize prices. The focus of this paper is rather on the technological aspect -the ability of …rms to redisgn easily and quickly their products in order to match consumers' desires -and price personalization comes as a result of 'technological' factors and strategic interaction.
As suggested above, product customization is particularly relevant in digital markets, where the availability of more ‡exible technologies makes customization feasible at reasonable low costs: information technologies, like technologies for processing, reproducing and distributing information, for example, enable …rms to change design and o¤er quickly and inexpensively one standard item and di¤erent versions of a good: software packages, personally con…gured computers, music, books and video-games are for this reason considered suitable for customization. Product customization strategies, and the associated price discrimination practices, can be "more widely practiced in electronic commerce since the transmutability of digital products make them highly customizable and detailed data on consumer preferences are more abundant in a computerized market environment" (Choi et al, 1997, p.8-1) . Indeed, in the digital markets consumer pro…les are easily inferred by web-based transactions 3 , which convey information on consumers' preferences. As real world examples one might quote Dell Computers and IBM, Motorola, Hewlett-Packard, which are increasingly customizing their products 4 . Interesting cases of customization are more often found in the e-commerce: McGraw Hill publisher, for example, makes now possible to order a book designed according to the preferred con…guration: di¤erent chapters of the books are combined by customers and printed or produced in a media format (CD-ROMs, DVDs or downloadable …les from the Internet) on consumer demand.
The decision of a …rm to customize a product is a strategic decision (Wallace, 2004) . To customize a product imposes a cost which depends on technological factors, but it allows the …rm to capture a larger share of consumers -this gain in terms of demand depending on the price paid for receiving a customized product. This price must re ‡ect the additional burden beared by the …rm. In order to capture this aspects, the most appropriate general framework is a traditional spatial model in that a customized product can be considered as a …nely differentiated product (Choi et al., 1997) . Moreover, in this kind of set-up, the cost of customization can be assimilated to a transportation cost paid by …rms. A famous example of spatial model in which transportation costs are paid by …rms and then translated to consumers is the Thisse and Vives's (1988) discriminatory pricing model 5 which perfectly replicates Hotelling's analogy between spatial location and preferences: di¤erent prices charged at each location (di¤er-ent delivery prices) can be seen as di¤erent prices charged for di¤erent versions of a basic product. Using the example o¤ered by Thisse and Vives on cider, the attributes of the latter, e.g. its di¤erent levels of sweetness, correspond to the varieties that are priced di¤erently, and the price paid for each variety depends on the 'transport' cost of altering the basic product. The role of transportation costs is not discussed in that paper, however they are clearly interpreted as the technological cost of redesigning the basic product -as Thisse and Vives state "How to change the sweetness of cider is a technical detail that we leave to the imagination of the reader" (p. 125). This is the point this paper deals with in an economic perspective. If di¤erent customization technologies are available, if …rms may choose their 'customization' cost, which is their optimal choice and its …nal implications in terms of market structure and equilibrium prices?
While this issue has not been previously analysed in the product customization literature, the problem of endogeneizing transportation costs has already been studied in a di¤erent perspective. Von Ungern-Sternberg (1988) and Hendel and Figueiredo (1997) present respectively a simultaneous and a sequential game where …rms engage in a product design competition modelled as a transportation cost competition, prior to price competition. In these Hotelling-type models, uniform pricing policy and perfectly inelastic market demand are assumed. The extent of transportation cost captures the so-called general purposeness of products. In the …rst model simultaneity leads …rms to choose optimally the lowest level of the transportation cost: a generalist good is therefore produced and this results in a tougher price competition. In the second, the strategic e¤ect on pricing due to the sequential structure of the game induces …rms competing in a duopoly setting to set a higher level of the transportation cost (they o¤er a more 'speci…c purpose' good or, in other words, they increase the degree of focus of their products), softening price competition. The results in both models rely on the assumption of costless ability of …rms to change focus. However, the existence of a cost of producing a general purpose product creates an additional incentive for …rms to increase focus in order to save costs.
While in these contributions …rms' competition in transportation costs is interpreted as a design competition leading …rms to make their products more speci…c or more general with respect to consumers' preferences, in this paper the transportation cost competition is assimilated to a technological competition. Changes in transportation costs are seen as technological changes associated to the customization process. Therefore, the pricing strategies for customized products result from competition in the technology of customization and from competition in …nal prices. The main result of the paper is that this technological competition intensi…es price competition (consistently with the …ndings in the literature on innovation), leading to a market con…guration characterized by high concentration and low prices for each variety of the customized good. In a sense the model may be seen as an attempt to justify the observed phenomenon of mass-customization: a few basic varieties of products are o¤ered, but in many versions and at low prices.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the spatial framework adopted in the model is brie ‡y described. Section 3 analyses a three stage-game in which, after pro…table entry, …rms engage a technological competition on customization costs and prices. This game is studied under two alternative hypotheses on the choice of customization costs: in section 3.1 this is assumed to be costless, i.e. …rms may choose di¤erent customization technologies without altering the production cost of the basic variety; in section 3.2 this simpli…ed assumption is relaxed, by positing that more e¢ciency in customization requires higher set-up costs. In the same section a brief discussion of the mass-customization phenomenon is also o¤ered. Finally, some concluding remarks and comments are gathered in section 4.
The spatial framework
Competitive product di¤erentiation under discriminatory pricing allows to study product customization. As mentioned above, the standard spatial model of price discrimination drawn from Thisse and Vives (1988) is used on this purpose. In order to investigate the long run equilibrium generating by a free-entry process, this framework is combined with the Salop model (1979).
More speci…cally, I consider the market for a horizontally di¤erentiated product, whose characteristics may be represented as points of a circle. Consumers are heterogeneous in preferences and uniformly distributed on this circle whose length is normalized to 1. Firms are located symmetrically on this characteristics space. In what follows a unit demand is assumed at all points of the circle. The product at …rm i's locations represent the basic product of …rm i, its basic variety, but the latter can be redesigned by the …rm in order to match the speci…c consumers' requirements bearing a unit constatnt customization cost t i , so that the total customization cost is assumed to be linear in distance. In what follows, we shall call variety the basic product o¤ered by the …rm, and version the tailored product o¤ered at each location. The parameter t i synthesizes the technological properties of the customization activity or equivalently, according to Norman (2003) and Thisse and Vives (1988) , the variable cost of redesigning the base product. The higher the technological parameter t i , the higher are the customization costs incurred by the …rm in the market.
We shall assume that each …rm has access to a set of di¤erent customization technologies. This set is the same for all …rms, which also share the same information technology. The customization technology adopted by a …rm is always observable by its competitor. The competing …rms are assumed to be able to o¤er individually tailored goods such that all the varieties of a basic product are o¤ered; moreover they are assumed to be able to discriminate perfectly among consumers, by setting a price schedule p (x) for each variety depending on consumers' location x, where x is the distance of a consumer from the generic …rm i. This price charged to the consumers includes the cost associated with product customization, so that the mill price at each location is the price corrected for the customization cost -the transportation cost of adapting the …rm's base product to consumers' needs.
In order to focus on the role of transportation costs, we assume that the basic variety is produced at zero variable costs. However, …rms bear a set-up cost F to enter the market. This cost may be either constant and independent of the customization cost, or decreasing in the latter. In the …rst case the choice of a more e¢cient customization technology is costless for the …rm; in the second e¢ciency in customization imposes higher set-up costs.
Pricing customization
It is within the above framework that the following three-stage game is analysed: …rms are assumed to decide …rst their entry into the market, and then to engage a customization cost competition and a price competition. At each stage of the game …rms' choices are simultaneous. The game is solved by backward induction. We solve …rst the price stage of the game, then we deal with the optimal choice of the customization cost. The optimal number of …rms is determined, in the third stage, by a standard zero pro…t condition. To start with, we consider a situation in which the set-up costs are exogenous and independent of the customization technology.
The case with …xed set-up costs 3.1.1 The price stage
At the price stage we assume that n …rms are on the circle, therefore a …rm is 1 n far from its neighbours. The customization cost which …rm i bears to deliver the product with attributes x is equal to t i x, while the same variety is delivered by the adjacent …rms at a cost equal to t i¡1
The equilibrium in prices is an optimal price schedule for each …rm, that holds for all possible values of the customization parameter.
Following a Bertrand argument, since consumers buy from the …rm charging the lowest delivery price, at each point x price competition among …rms results in a delivered price that cannot be higher than the transportation cost to buy the product of the closest rival …rm. As demonstrated by Lederer and Hurter (1986) in their in ‡uential work, the 1 n consumers between two …rms on the circle will be charged by …rm i with a price in…nitesimally lower than Figure 1 shows the optimal price schedule of …rm i under the assumption that the neighbouring …rms have the same customization cost.
It is easy to check that the distance between …rm i and the indi¤erent consumer between …rm i and its (identical neighbours) is ti¡1 n(ti+ti¡1) : Notice that, di¤erently from the traditional Hotelling model, the highest prices are actually paid to …rm i by those among its customers who are located at a lower distance, while the indi¤erent consumer pays the lowest price.
Notice also that in the presence of symmetric customization costs, the market share of each …rm at equilibrium will be obviously equal to 1 n and pro…ts accruing to each …rm are:
Given this positive relationship between t and the level of pro…ts, we now investigate the technological stage of the game in which …rms optimally choose their customization costs. Assume now that …rms may choose the customization costs, by adopting a costreducing technology con…guration. The technology switching is assumed to be costless. More precisely we assume that each …rm may choose any t in the admissible range [t min ; t max ] : The existence of a lower bound may be seen as a technological constraint. The existence of an upper bound must be imposed in order to ensure that market is fully covered for reasonable values of the consumers' reservation utility.
The simultaneous choice of the customization cost may therefore be seen as a sort of technological competition among …rms. Consider the optimal behaviour of …rm i, given the behaviour of its adjacent rivals, …rm i ¡ 1 and …rm i + 1. If the latter behave identically, i.e. t i+1 = t i¡1 , pro…ts of …rm i may be written as:
Inspection of the pro…t function (1) shows that for all possible values of t i¡1 , pro…ts of …rm i are monotonically decreasing in t i . The intuition behind this result is the following: the …rm's pro…ts at each served location are the di¤erence between the rival's customization cost at that location and its own customization cost: a cost reduction is pro…table for a …rm because it increases the mill price without a¤ecting prices. Moreover, by reducing t i …rm i increases its market share. As a result, choosing the lowest possible t is a dominant strategy for each …rm. Therefore, imposing the symmetry condition, the Nash equilibrium in customization costs is t i = t i¡1 = t min .
Proposition. When technology switching is costless, …rms behaving non cooperatively choose the minimum level of the customizaton cost technologically available, t = t min .
Notwithstanding the fact that the choice of a higher level of the technological parameter would soften price competition in the last stage of the game, …rms choose to lower them. Notice that this is consistent with the cost paradox …rst discussed by Nelson (1957) . 6 When …rms may costlessly choose the customization cost, the production technology game is a prisoner's dilemma. The equilibrium pro…ts are:
Given the positive relation between pro…ts and the customization cost, …rms would clearly bene…t from a cooperative and simultaneous increase of t. Indeed, the non-cooperative and the cooperative solution are the two corner solutions, t min in the former case, t max in the latter.
The entry stage
The equilibrium number of …rms is determined by the technological parameter t min : The zero pro…t condition entails 7 :
The equilibrium number of …rms is increasing in t min and (obviously) decreasing in F . At equilibrium customers of …rm i face the following price schedule:
which is increasing in t min for all x served by i at equilibrium. Notice …nally that the lower the minimum customization cost, the lower the number of …rms and the lower the price paid for the customized product by each customer. Therefore, an interesting feature which emerges in this set-up is that a concentrated market structure is consistent with low prices: both may be a consequence of a technological competition which translates into lower prices and reduces pro…ts. In this sense, the model is consistent with a widely observed feature of digital markets, where products are customizable at very low costs, a few number of basic varieties are produced (the number of …rms is low), each of them o¤ered in many di¤erent versions (the market share of each …rm is wide) at low prices. On the contrary, in markets where the customization technology is more costly we should expect that a great number of varieties be actually o¤ered, each of them in a few versions, at high prices.
The result that the availability of e¢cient customization technologies and the technological competition lead to a more concentrated market structure, with a reduction of the number of basic varieties sold at low prices in many di¤erent versions, has been derived here under the simpli…ed assumption that e¢ciency in versioning is indeed costless. Under this assumption the technological competition has a corner solution. In the next section we verify the robustness of this result by reformulating the game in a situation in which the adoption of low cost customization technologies imposes signi…cant costs to the …rms.
The case with endogenous set-up costs
Let us assume now that the choice of the customization technology is costly for the …rm. The idea we want to capture is that the possibility of customizing the basic product at low cost requires higher investments, which can be assimilated to higher …xed costs expenditure that reduce marginal customization costs (Schwartz, 1989 ). In order to be able to o¤er di¤erent versions of the basic product at low cost, …rms must a¤ord heavier sut-up costs. With this modi…ca-tion, the analysis of customization gets signi…cantly close to that of ‡exibility in production. As Norman (2003) argues: 'the adoption of ‡exible manufacturing imposes penalties with respect to the additional set-up costs that are necessary to establish such ‡exible systems' (p.420). Flexibility is in this case de…ned as the ability of a production technology to transfer the input factors from the …xed to the variable category (Stigler, 1939 and Roller and Tombak, 1990) .
Therefore, in this section we modify the above framework by assuming that the set-up costs faced by any …rm i depend on the chosen level of the customization cost. In other words the set-up costs are no more exogenous, but determined by the optimal choice of the customization parameter. A useful speci…cation of the set-up cost function is the following:
This function is decreasing in t i in the given interval, so that set-up cost savings occur as t i grows. The upper bound on t i is set for analytical convenience, but indeed it will turn out to be not binding. It is interesting to notice the role of the parameter b: as it increases, the set-up cost function becomes ‡atter, so that higher values of b imply a lower sensitivity of set-up costs with respect to changes in the customization technology. Figure  2 shows the di¤erent shape taken by the S i function for di¤erent values of b.
The solution of the price stage of the game is clearly not a¤ected by the endogeneization of set-up costs, which rather a¤ects the technological stage. 
The technological game revisited
Given the above formulation of the set-up costs, the pro…ts of …rm i can be rewritten as
The …rst order conditions for …rm i evaluated under symmetry entail the following solution:
where © (z) obeys © (z) e ©(z) = z and is the so called LambertW function. 8 As examples of this solution, one may check that for b = 1 and n = 2 the optimal value is t i ' 0:85329; for b = 0:8 and n = 2, t i ' 1:0666. It is possible to verify that t i < 1 b for all values of b and n, so that the upper bound imposed to t i is not binding. Moreover, t i is clearly decreasing in b: for a given number of …rms, as b increases, making the set-up cost function ‡atter, …rms switch to more e¢cient customization technologies. This result is indeed intuitive: the lower is the marginal increase in set-up costs required by a marginal decrease in t i , the higher is the incentive of …rms to adopt the technologies allowing a cheaper customization.
The entry stage
; moreover, lim n!1 h (b; n) = ¢ , there exists a unique solution for n, with 1 < n < 1.
The equilibrium number of …rms is decreasing in b. Indeed, implicit di¤er-entiation of the zero pro…t condition gives
which is negative, since @h @b < 0 for all n > 1. The economic implications of the above analytical …ndings are easily stated. As discussed above, parameter b may be seen as an inverse index of the cost incurred by …rms when they try to gain more e¢ciency in their customization technology. As b increases, …rms are induced to choose optimally a more e¢-cient customization technology -provided it is actually available (t ¤ i > t min ) -notwithstanding the fact that this makes price competition tougher. Pro…ts are reduced and a lower number of …rms enters the market. This reduction in the number of …rms induces a further reduction in prices, given the properties of price competition in this discriminatory price setting.
This con…rms the sharp result obtained in the …xed cost case. There, the number of basic varieties and the price of the various versions of these basic varieties was related to the availability of cheap customization technologies (the level of t min ). Here, they depend on the marginal cost of gains in customization e¢ciency. However, the analysis of the endogenous set-up costs case may well explain some properties of the markets of the so-called information goods. These goods are easily customizable, in the sense that …rms may cheaply move towards customized production. The increasing customization of these products has been accompanied by a progressive reduction of the number of basic varieties o¤ered and a decrease in prices (as an example, one may quote many software applications).
An explanation of mass-customization
The growing adoption of the competitive strategy of personalization has led to the phenomenon known as mass customization. In Vulkan's (2003) words:
'Mass customization occurs where …rms can o¤er at the same constant marginal costs without having to incur additional …xed costs on every di¤erentiated brand they o¤er ' (p.48) Indeed, mass customization is a concept born in the late 1980's and is now considered a new frontier in business competition. 9 In the last years, the ability of …rms to o¤er high volumes of designed products at reasonably low costs (da Silveira et al, 2001 ) has induced a change in production patterns from the socalled mass standardization to mass customization.
The results obtained in the current work may explain mass customization as the outcome of optimal technological and pricing strategies of …rms operating in an imperfectly competitive setting. The technological feasibility of tailoring goods is a necessary, but not su¢cient condition for widespread customization. In a monopoly setting, highly personalized products always lead to higher prices and pro…ts (due to the additional surplus extraction allowed by price discrimination); on the contrary, in a imperfectly competitive environment this positive e¤ect on pro…ts may be outweighted when customization increases the intensity of price competition. The equilibrium outcome is a reduction of prices. The paper suggests that it's competition in customization costs that leads …rms to o¤er tailored goods at a low cost. This is a relatively recent phenomenon. While customized products have always been attractive to consumers, their high prices made them mostly una¤ordable in the past. Customization and low prices were at that time considered as con ‡icting goals. The simultaneous existence of advanced technologies for customization and competition in customization are now letting …rms to o¤er custom design and individualized services on a large scale and at low prices, allowing more personalization at the lower mass production prices: integrating e¢ciency with customization results in mass customization. The two features of customization and mass production are combined together.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have discussed the optimal pricing strategies of …rms o¤ering customized products in an imperfect competitive spatial environment and the optimal structure of these markets. It must be stressed that the paper does not discuss neither the conditions under which …rms can pro…tably increase their ability to customize, nor the issue of the optimal degree of customization. Rather, the model embodies the idea that each consumer always achieves the desidered good; though bearing a cost, …rms can produce all desired versions of a basic commodity, so that that we can refer to the basic structure of the model as one of 'perfect customization'. Therefore, the emphasis of the paper has been given to the analysis of the conditions ensuring that perfect customization can be supported at low prices.
We can identify two main directions of our analysis: we have explored the e¤ects of competition in the customization technology and examined the equilibrium market structure under the two alternative hyptheses of exogenous and endogenous set-up costs. Indeed, two types of cost have been modeled: the cost of producing a basic variety of a good and the cost of customizing it in order to obtain di¤erent versions, with the plausible assumption that production costs are …xed, while customization costs are variable, depending on the extent of customization and the quantity produced. 10 The exogenous set-up cost version of the model is one in which the two costs are independent; in the second the size of …xed costs is inversely related to the unit customization cost.
The …rst result of our analysis is that, under the assumption of a costless technology choice, competition in customization induces …rms handling multiple versions to adopt the most e¢cient personalization technology. In particular, it has been demonstrated that when …rms may choose non cooperatively the customization parameter, the existence of a perfect spillover -due to the correspondence between the price set at equilibrium and the technological parameter chosen by the closest rivals -leads to an equilibrium outcome of the Prisoner's Dilemma type: prices and pro…ts are reduced to the minimum levels consistent with technology and the nature of discriminatory price competition. The optimal number of varieties and market concentration is determined by two technological factors: the size of the exogenous set-up costs (as usual) and the cost parameter of the most e¢cient customization technology. In the long run equilibrium, the maximum e¢ciency in customization turns out to be associated to a mostly concentrated market structure, which is equivalent to the existence of a few basic varieties o¤ered, each of them in many versions.
These extreme results are quantitatively smoothed, but qualitatively con…rmed, in an endogenous set-up cost framework. If set-up costs increase when customization costs are lowered, market concentration turns out to depend on the marginal loss, in terms of set-up costs, of an increase of e¢ciency in customization. When the set-up costs increase slowly following a reduction in customization costs, more e¢ciency in customization will be chosen at equilibrium and this will lead to lower prices. In contrast with the existing literature based on Hotelling models, a more concentrated market is associated to lower prices for customized products. In other words customization at low prices becomes feasible as the investment in implementing personalization systems is relatively low. In contrast, as long as the accessible technology allows to reduce the customization costs by enhancing signi…cantly the set-up costs, prices for customized goods will be higher and a more fragmented market will arise at equilibrium. Even in this richer framework, the tendency towards customization at low prices stems from two basic elements: the technological possibility of customizing at low cost and the implementation of these e¢cient technologies due to a sort of technological competition between …rms, which is translated into a price competition.
Finally the paper can o¤er insights on the role of customization technology competition in explaining the mass-customization phenomenon. To the best of our knowledge, this issue, widely discussed in the management literature, has been mostly neglected in the theoretical economic analysis. In this sense the paper can represent a step towards the development of a research agenda focused to an economic analysis of customization strategies.
